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PARDON ME BUT You GOT MY BEST BITS:
MIISAPPROPRIATION OF PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
AND THE NEW AGE OF PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY RIGHTS




Imagine that you need a crispy white shirt. Perhaps this is a fine opportunity
to try out a new cyber-cash account. So you search for and locate
http://www.crispywhiteshirt.com and discover a digitized Madonna, or rather,
sort of Madonna. This character bears a strong resemblance to Madonna, except
she is singing the virtues of linen shirtings with a man's voice that is very remi-
niscent of the sweet, mellifluous Frank Sinatra. Panning down, you are presented
with a pair of legs that, if you didn't know better, and you don't, sure look like
those of Julia Roberts. Madonna pauses briefly and says in a breathy voice,
"They're crisp" and you notice that the teeth are a little bucky. They actually
belong to the CEO of CrispyWhiteShirt.com Inc., whose company identification-
badge photo was digitized and infused into Mad's binary soul-just for fun. We
all need a little cosmetic work to shape and enhance our natural features.
The gold rush to commercial activity on the Internet will provide a new oppor-
tunity for marketing gurus to reach straight through to targeted consumers.
Digitally manifested activity has become increasingly interactive and reality-
altering to accommodate the Generation X taste for kaleidoscopic head-rush
images and sounds.1 The digital possibilities are infinite and the capacity to
sever, morph, and recombine personal characteristics will likely stretch the cur-
rent bounds of privacy and publicity law. Part I of this Article will provide a
brief overview of the historic genesis and development of privacy and publicity
protections. Part II will discuss developments in Internet space that portend
global marketing opportunities for commercial enterprises. Part III will examine
recent cases that indicate possible further refinement of publicity rights. The
Article concludes that protection of privacy rights may be more difficult to assert
in the rush to put streaming video of everyday activity on Internet sites (so-called
reality programming) while publicity rights may be refined to catch commercial
exploitation of particular personal attributes.
* Associate with the Intellectual Property Group at Preston, Gates & Ellis, LLP in Seattle, Washington. J.D.,
1996 (cur laude), Mississippi College School of Law; LL.M., Intellectual Property Law, University of
Houston, 1997.
** LL.M. (Intellectual Property), University of Houston Law Center, 1996; J.D., University of Arkansas at
Little Rock School of Law, 1977; M.J., University of North Texas, 1976; B.S., Arkansas State University, 1970.
Member, Arkansas Bar. Professor of Journalism and Mass Communication, Texas A&M University. Adjunct
Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. Mr. Tomlinson has published extensively on technology-
related aspects of intellectual property.
1. See Azby Brown, Portrait of the Artist as a Young Geek, 5.05 WiRED, May 1997, at 186.
<http://www.wired.con/wired/archive/5.05/ffiwai_pr.html>.
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II. HISTORIC RISE OF PERSONAL RIGHTS IN PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY
Ancient Roman law recognized a legal right for private citizens "to be let
alone" while pursuing personal business.2 The precise parameters of this right
are not fully known but this may be characterized as an early, flickering emana-
tion of privacy rights. Nearly two millennia would pass before the common law
developments conceptualized the privacy right. There was no developed history




The origin of a judicially cognizable cause of action in the United States is tra-
ditionally traced to a famous law review article, which proposed a legally cogniz-
able right of privacy.' The article proposed a right of privacy providing legal
power to prevent intrusive behavior. This concept was predicated on "personal
freedom"' and was purportedly born of the co-author's distaste for unfavorable
press coverage of private social functions hosted by related family members., It
was another fifteen years before the academic ponderings found judicial accep-
tance.
The first case proposing such a right involved the use of the likeness of a
young woman on 25,000 posters advertising the virtues of the Franklin Mills
Company.7 The rosy-cheeked image projected wholesome beauty, but the girl's
parents objected on the ground that her privacy was impermissibly invaded by
the use of the unauthorized image. The plaintiffs were unsuccessful.8
The first successful claim was brought a few years later and concerned pho-
tographs used in advertisements for life insurance.9 In that case, the court per-
mitted recovery on the theory that the personal liberty interests of the plaintiff
were invaded by the "unwanted publicity" associated with the ad campaign."
Here the basis for the claim was not monetary damage, but psychological injury
relating to the "injured feelings caused by the unauthorized use" of the plaintiff's
likeness." A personal interest in a private life free from the imposition of public-
ity was thereby born.
2. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1.2, 1-8 (1992).
3. Id.
4. Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
5. See H. Lee Hetherington, Direct Commercial Exploitation of Identity: A New Age for the Right of
Publicity, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS I (1992).
6. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 1.2.
7. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y 1902).
8. Id.
9. Pasevich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
10. Hetherington, supra note 5, at 4 (citing Pasevich).
II. Id. at 5.
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The now famous formulation of various interests protected under the privacy
rubric was presented by Dean Prosser in a 1960 article. 2 In all, the rights con-
templated were aimed at protecting personal liberty and private concerns from
public disclosure or commercial exploitation.
B. The Right of Publicity
According to Andy Warhol, America is a nation infatuated with celebrity. The
rise of Hollywood, professional sports, television, and radio created a new class
of citizen. The new American hero was known in public, thrived on public atten-
tion, and demanded money for his public activities. In fact, her financial success
required public promotion. The interests protected under privacy concerns were
altered by the purposeful public presence inherent in celebrity status.
13
In 1953, the Second Circuit recognized a legally protectible interest in publici-
ty for a baseball player who had licensed the use of his photograph to promote
chewing-gum.' A competitor induced the player to breach his contract and
defended the action under a theory that the player had only privacy interests at
stake.'" The court disagreed, finding that the player had a "right in the publicity
value of his photograph" that could be exploited and transferred by contract.
16
Thus, the right of publicity was born which would be of use to celebrities in the
growing economic sectors "being created by the entertainment, media, and
advertising industries.""
New concerns about the application of rights of privacy and publicity are
raised in the context of the World Wide Web and the integrated interface of per-
sonal technology and human interconnectedness. The nature of digitally distrib-
uted works provide for near global accessibility to images and sounds mixed for
the medium. The commercial opportunities are vast, as is the potential for viola-
tions of privacy and publicity concerns. The value of these rights increases in
relation to the permeation of cyberspace into our daily existence.
III. THE DIGITAL AGE
There is tremendous potential for communicative interaction and commercial
opportunity on the Internet.'8 Digital distribution platforms are becoming
increasingly interactive, with video on demand and other online applications
delivered through coaxial cable, fiber optic networks, and via wireless spectral
12. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383 (1960). The rights included:
1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude or into his private affairs;
2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff;
3) Publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and
4) Appropriation for the defendant's advantage of the plaintiff's name or likeness.
13. Hetherington, supra note 5, at 6.
14. Haelen Lab. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
15. Id. at 868.
16. Id.
17. Hetherington, supra note 5, at 2.
18. See Selected Tax Policy Implications of Global Electronic Commerce, Department of the Treasury
Office of Tax Policy § 3.14, (Nov. 1996) <http://www.ustreas.gov.>.
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transmissions." In the very near future there will be "[n]o practical distinction...
between the television screen and the computer monitor; both present viable out-
lets for the user's end of the pipeline."2 There may be little to distinguish
"between the couch potato and the mouse potato" except the fact that the mouse
potato can cut, paste, and rework digital materials to be redistributed via the
same networks." These types of electronic activities represent a shift in para-
digm as wire and wireless technologies provide a new way to deliver digital
entertainment products to customers. 2
Push technology and the fusion of television with computers will allow digital
artists to be transformed into entertainment providers. 3 Push technology allows
information and entertainment to cascade through the entire network of "all
forms of communications devices," gently propelled by anyone who wishes to
broadcast materials throughout the globe.24 The combination of new distribution
pipelines and interactive software distribution platforms will allow everyone to
be a moviemaker, music publisher, or international marketeer .2  This technologi-
cal convergence of telecommunications capacity and digitally manipulable
works2" creates some interesting challenges for the traditional fields of privacy
and publicity.
A. Privacy Issues in Cyberspace
Privacy issues in the Internet space have been much debated in connection with
emerging standards governing the collection of personally identifiable informa-
tion and encryption that centers on the protection of communications and person-
al information transmitted across the Internet. 7 For purposes of this Article, the
focus is on Prosser's fourth privacy category, protection against appropriation of
the name and likeness for advantage.28 It is true that society is becoming more
19. Bradford C. Auerbach, The Infobahn: Who Pays What?, 428 PLUPAT 7, 9 (1996).
20. Id. at 9.
21. Id.
22. Craig Harding, On-line Distribution of Multimedia Products, 428 PLI/PAT 425, 439-40 (1996). New
technology is bringing WebTV to hotel rooms across the country. The packages include unlimited access to the
Internet, chat rooms, and "Kid-Friendly" with plans to include the capacity to play Sony video games. See Jeff
Pelline, WebTV Wires Hotel Suites, c/net NEWS.COM (Feb. 4, 1997)
<http://www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C7620%2C0O.htrnl?nd>. Digital streaming technology is creat-
ing smoother delivery of audio and audio-visual works. See generally Jan Ozer, Web TV Tunes In, PC
MAGAZrNE, Mar. 26, 1996, at 129.
23. Kevin Kelly & Gary Wolf, PUSH! Kiss Your Browser Goodbye: The Radical Future of Media Beyond
The Web, 5.03 WIRED, Mar. 1997, at 12.
<wysiwyg:/13/http://www.wired.comlwired/archive/5.03/ff push_.pr.html>.
24. Id. at 14. Developing technologies such as Castanet, PointCaste, and Netscape In-Box Direct provide
software platforms which permit content to be "pushed" to the recipient in a type of individualized broadcast.
"[Alnything flows from anyone to anyone-from anywhere to anywhere-anytime... a true network like the
telephone system, rather than a radiating system like radio or TV.'
25. Steven Levy, Ilow the Propeller Heads Stole the Electronic Future, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 24, 1995, at
58-59.
26. See Pamela Samuelson, Digital Media and the Changing Face of Intellectual Property Law, 16 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 323, 326 (1990) (discussing pertinent characteristics of digital works); see also Don E.
Tomlinson, Journalism and Entertainment as Intellectual Property on the Information Superhighway: The
Challenge of the Digital Domain, 6 STAN. L. & PoL'y REv. 61 (1994).
27. See Todd Lappin, Winning the Crypto Wars, 5.05 WIRED, May 1997, at 94.
<http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/5.05/cyber-rights__pr.html>.
28. See Prosser, supra note 12, at 383.
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"transparent" as personal activities are recorded on everything from security
cameras to streaming video shots of everyday activities.2 9 We are increasingly
aware that we are filmed and recorded. What happens when we are informed
that a particular public event is on the Internet in a real-time web cast and we
choose to remain? It seems a fair argument that our recorded movements are in
some sense given to the camera with our consent. We choose to enter public
places where recordation is the order of the day. Capture of personal characteris-
tics in digital media raises some interesting issues.
The extent to which a person may waive certain facets of his right of "privacy"
in an electronically connected world is a question in the making. Many people
post personal photos on the Internet."t The essential notion underlying privacy
concerns is the right to seclusion, to lead a private life.31 Injecting our private
lives into the digital stream may waive certain aspects of personal privacy.32 It is
true that most people would still object to the commercial use of digitized mate-
rials, which have been made accessible on the Web without permission. The
problem is that many recombinant uses of digital materials on the Internet may
have no commercial motivation.
The tort, as traditionally outlined, focuses on impermissible commercial
exploitation of a person's likeness or image. In a non-commercial setting, it
would be difficult to assert damages caused by a transformed use of material
placed on the Web with consent.' A different relationship between the "outside"
public world and a person's private life may be created in the context of the
Internet. The concept of implied waiver may become applicable to a certain
extent where a person has uploaded audiovisual material featuring a likeness of
himself or herself.' If someone reconstitutes material on the Web, either through
archiving activities or through creation of compiled directories of images and
sounds of people in cyberspace, such non-commercial use may be permitted by
implied consent. Privacy claims may be difficult to assert in this new medium
that permits the projection of personal characteristics into a malleable virtual
reality.
The protection of privacy interests in digitally distributed materials will proba-
bly continue to focus specifically on commercial appropriation of personal char-
acteristics in situations where the defendant reaps a financial reward for the
29. See David Brin, The Transparent Society: The Cameras Are Coming. They're Getting Smaller and
Nothing Will Stop Them. The Only Question is. Who Watches Whom?, 4.12 WIRED, Dec. 1996, at 261.
<http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.12/fftransparent-pr.html>.
30. See <http://www.geocities.com> for an online community with personal addresses and Web-pages fea-
turing photos and information on the page owners.
31. See RAYMON T. NIMMER, INFp mOAIOnN LAw, § 8.07f 1] (1996).
32. Id. Professor Nimmer notes that consent for certain uses is implied in "material committed to the pub-
lic.' The open nature of the Internet probably supports the notion that this is a very public medium-and that
activities occurring in cyberspace take on a public character.
33. For purposes of this discussion, we ignore the copyright implications of copied materials that could be
the subject of copyright protection. A separate claim may be made out for infringement of the exclusive rights
in 17 U.S.C. § 106.
34. See NIKMER, supra note 31, at § 8.07[1]. Privacy torts are limited by the express or implicit consent of
an individual who injects himself into a public environment.
1999)
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use. 5 It is unlikely that a commercial use of images and sounds placed in the
digital stream would overcome the line of cases beginning with Pasevich v. New
England Life Insurance Co. that provided for protection against commercial
appropriation.
3 6
The more interesting question focuses on whether, in light of the global reach
of Internet-distributed digital materials, essentially non-famous people may
begin to acquire cognizable publicity interests. A particularly fetching video clip
posted to a Web page on a major community site like GeoCities could provide
instant fame. It would be fair to say that due to the Internet buzz surrounding
The Blair Witch Project, its unknown cast members were widely recognizable
prior to release of the film in theaters.
B. Publicity in Cyberspace
Publicity concerns traditionally focus on the protection of persons who exploit
personal characteristics for profit." Publicity rights have been considered part of
the law of privacy, as based on Prosser's formulation, and have focused on the
concern that personal characteristics should not be commercially exploited with-
out permission." The more common application applies to the name and like-
ness of a celebrity, which may obtain a valuable commercial status. ",
However, defined broadly, the concept may be characterized as the "inherent
right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identi-
ty."' This more sweeping notion would put to rest the need to define "celebrity"
status." Perhaps the age of Warhol is here and some degree of fame is possible
for many wishing to broadcast themselves to the world via cyberspace. Publicity
rights have developed in both statutory and common law realms, and generally
create broad interests in commercial exploitation of name and likeness, with cer-
tain important exceptions."2 Beyond the commercial use in advertising, the
"publicity right rapidly loses strength."43 First Amendment concerns present
countervailing interests in efforts to "disseminate news, facts, history, and
ideas."" The so-called "incidental use" exception protects use that is "incidental
to a larger purpose" and traditionally relates to the reuse of images that were
originally published with the consent of a celebrity.' 5 Where a likeness is used to
35. See Hetherington, supra note 5 (proposing a test for publicity violations of direct commercial exploita-
tion).
36. See also Prosser, supra note 12.
37. Hetherington, supra note 5, at 5.
38. NIMMER, supra note 31, at § 6.19.
39. Id. at § 7. For general discussion of the right of publicity, see Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of
Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROas. 203 (1954).
40. McCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 28.0 1[I].
41. This is an arguably difficult task given that many sports figures and performing artists have a degree of
celebrity status defined by geography or niche markets when compared to the Hollywood mega-stars and big
name professional athlete endorsement hounds.
42. See generally Robert L. Raskopf, The Right of Publicity and the Internet, 454 PLIIPAr 59 (1996).
43. NIMMER, supra note 3 1, at § 6.21 [2].
44. See Raskopf, supra note 42, at 63.
45. Id. at 69.
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convey information about a publication and its content or quality, the use is often
excused."8 A further limitation on the right is a separate category under First
Amendment jurisprudence permitting parodic uses.'7 Taken together, the com-
mercial value of personal characteristics is essentially limited to "direct commer-
cial" exploitation under the right of publicity.'8
Nevertheless, the right has been extended to a fairly wide range of actions
relating to the appropriation of signatures, likenesses, photographs and vocal
qualities.' In the context of cyberspace, digital works make severability and
reconstitution of specific human attributes possible. The capacity to morph and
alter digital material may require the extension of publicity protection to "all
incidents of a person's identity."' The problem will undoubtedly focus on cog-
nizability and on the specific value attached to specific incidents of personal
characteristics.
IV RECENT CASE LAW RELATING TO DIGITAL WORKS
In Pesina v. Midway Manufacturing Co., the plaintiff was a martial arts expert,
and his services were used in the production of a video game."1 In 1991, 1992,
and 1993, Pesina was hired as a model to provide a basis for the creation of cer-
tain digitized game characters. 2 His high-flying movements were captured and
scanned into a digital format." Then his "moves" were digitally incorporated
into an arcade video game character known as "Johnny Cage."'"
Subsequently, the defendant licensed the rights to create home video game ver-
sions of the games, Mortal Kombat and Mortal Kombat 1I, which were compati-
ble with Nintendo and Sega game systems."5 Pesina claimed that the use of his
"persona, name, and likeness without authorization in the home version of
Mortal Kombat" infringed his right of publicity.'
The court began its analysis by noting that the plaintiff had to prove that his
persona had a commercial value at the time of the alleged infringement." Here
the court found no evidence that Pesina's personal characteristics had obtained
46. Id. at 69-71.
47. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding First
Amendment rights outweighed baseball players' publicity interests in parodic baseball cards). It is important to
note that parody defenses apply only when a parodist satirizes the very thing that constitutes the content of the
work. It is not available for works which only use recognizable materials to parody a separate work.
48. Hetherington, supra note 5, at 3. The only U.S. Supreme Court case to directly address the issue held
that the complete appropriation of a human cannon-ball act, shown on the evening news, significantly impaired
the economic value of the act and was thus not permitted under publicity law. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
49. See Hetherington, supra note 5, at 7.
50. Id. at 12.
51. Pesina v. Midway Mfg. Co., 948 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. 111. 1996).
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any value before his "association with Mortal Kombat and Mortal Kombat II.'
The court further asserted that the plaintiff had to show that his "likeness was
recognizable.
' 5
Pesina's characteristic moves and his likeness had been "extensively altered
prior to being incorporated into the games," and thus he was not recognizable to
the video game playing public.' Evidence was introduced to show that of the
306 Mortal Kombat video game players surveyed, only six percent identified
Pesina as the model for "Johnny Cage."6 The court held that Pesina was not able
to show that his identity had become "inextricably intertwined" with "Johnny
Cage" in the public conscience."2 Since Pesina was not a "widely known martial
artist" the public would not recognize him in the Cage character." He just was
not famous enough.
The court focused its analysis on the capacity of the relevant consumer group
to recognize Pesina. His form and movements were digitally incorporated into
Johnny Cage, but the editing process had sufficient cosmetic effect to hide
Pesina's attributes from the majority of persons surveyed. The issues raised here
relate both to the breadth of protection for incidents of personal characteristics
and the scope of the realm designated celebrity status.
A. Severable Personal Characteristics
In Midler v. Ford Motor Co., the Ninth Circuit found that Bette Midler's voice
was impermissibly appropriated, through the use of a sound-alike singer, in an
automobile commercial.6 The court found that Midler's distinctive voice merit-
ed protection under common law publicity rights."' Here we see the protection of
a personal characteristic that is closely and strongly associated with a celebrity.
This line of reasoning could be extended to a smile, a crop of hair, a prominent
nose, ears, musculature, eyes, hands, feet, and any other physical characteristic
that has obtained value for a "celebrity." The manipulation and morphing activi-
ties on the World Wide Web provide a basis for the assertion that such severable
characteristics may become important elements meriting protection under public-
ity law. An example of the cut-and-paste technologies currently available to digi-
tal artists can be seen on The Mona Mailart Show, broadcast on the Internet,
which features digitally manipulated images of Mona Lisa."
The holding in Pesina will serve to limit such protections where the specific
characteristics are not sufficiently identifiable and recognizable as associated
58. Id.





64. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 503 U.S. 951 (1992).
65. Id. at 463.
66. See Rusty Clark, The Mona Mailart Show (visited Feb. 1I, 1998)
<http://www.geocities.com//SoHo/7022/>.
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with a particular person. The more difficult issue may be where to draw the line
around the class of persons that will be considered celebrities.
B. Fame and the Line Between Privacy and Publicity
It may be that the distinction between a commercial appropriation that violates
privacy and one that violates publicity rights will become less relevant in cyber-
space. As people "project" themselves into the public virtual reality, they do so
in a form of digital manifestation that is subject to recombinant and altered treat-
ment. Characterizing the Web as a public place may blur the lines between the
traditional concepts of privacy and publicity. Where the touchstone of publicity
has been that it protects the persons who make their livelihood from exploitation
of personal characteristics, privacy has protected persons in their solitude. To the
extent that the Web becomes a commercial marketplace, where people use audio-
visual works in their Web pages to promote their own products or services, noto-
riety and fame may no longer be purely a function of the silver screen or tradi-
tional broadcast media.
Publicity and privacy concerns may begin to collapse into a generalized protec-
tion against appropriation of personal characteristics for commercial advantage,
regardless of traditional status awarded to those members of the professional
sports and entertainment world.
V CONCLUSION
The advent of the digitally interconnected virtual reality known as cyberspace
will cause a certain strain on the distinctions between protectible privacy con-
cerns and publicity rights. Protection may have to extend to severable personal
characteristics that are closely identified with a person. Where a digitized work
portrays cognizable features in a manipulated way, protection should be provided
where the work has a direct commercial marketing purpose. As for the blending
of privacy and publicity, projection of personal characteristics into digital virtual
reality may serve to waive some of the traditional rights upheld in privacy
jurisprudence.
1999]

